How We Got Here (7/3/07)

I started this in March, and to follow up, here's more from Bob Woodward’s “State Of Denial,” the third book in his "Bush At War" series.

And to make it easier to go back and read prior posts related to Woodward's book, I set up an index page of sorts here.

I should note that I finished reading this book over my vacation, and it is a great work by Woodward, though I still think he should have written it two books ago. Unlike anything else in my experience, it is a profile of cronyism, incompetence, groupthink-run-amok and generally way too many people afraid to tell other people the truth, apparently because they would soil their comfortable Washington nests, as it were, with the genuine tragedy being that our fine service people, as well as other coalition force members and innocent Iraqis, have paid the price for it.

Since this is my last post based on this book, I think it is only appropriate that it be centered on the person more responsible than anyone else for our nightmare in Iraq, and that would be none other than Donald H. (“The Defense Secretary You Have”) Rumsfeld.

There is so much to despise about this man in his former job that it’s hard to summarize it; the typical Bushco hubris, intimidation, blind certainty, resistance to facts that challenge preconceived notions…it just goes on and on and on (and to think he’s shopping around for an advance on a possible book deal – it is truly almost too much to bear).

And there weren’t too many times when Rummy was shown up, not nearly as many times as there should have been, but this passage describes one of them (I didn’t know Ken Adelman was as knowledgeable on Iraq as he is portrayed here, by the way).

pp. 431-434

The defense policy board, the outside senior group of advisers for Rumsfeld that included Kissinger, Newt Gingrich and Ken Adelman, met at the Pentagon for two days of closed-door briefings on December 8 and 9 (2005). During the first day, Ryan Henry, a top Rumsfeld deputy, briefed on the Quadrennial Defense Review, the detailed strategy for the U.S. military over the next 20 years. Rumsfeld thought this was one of his greatest accomplishments – a blueprint for the future. Midway through a long PowerPoint briefing with slides and charts, Henry paused. “The good news is that not one defense program had to be cut,” he said.

“Well, why is that good news?” Adelman interrupted. It was unusual to break in. “A Strategic review for four years since the war on terrorism began, since 9/11 happened, since the world is different and there wasn’t one program you could eliminate?”

Henry said that everyone in the building – civilians and those in uniform – had decided nothing had to be cut.

“I’m sorry I interrupted,” Adelman said, “but I just find it incredible.”

The next day, the board met with Rumsfeld, who was proud of the in-depth review, which included plans to increase Special Operations Forces by some 15 percent and to add sophisticated programs to fight terrorism and to deal with weapons of mass destruction.

“I think Ken has a different view on that,” said Chris Williams, a defense contractor and lobbyist who was board chairman. Dissent was unusual.

“What’s that?” asked Rumsfeld tartly of the man he had wanted to run his presidential campaign 20 years earlier.

(Think about that for a minute – Rummy as President; truly the stuff of nightmares, even more than what we have already.)

Adelman, exasperated, said that after four years of work, after 9/11, and after all the efforts at transformation, with Rumsfeld spending maybe a quarter of his time with the QDR, and the deputy up to half his time, “I find it incredible that nothing is going to be cut.”

“Who told you that?”

Adelman at first didn’t want to single out Ryan Henry, so he said maybe he had misunderstood.

“Who said that?” Rumsfeld pressed.

“Ryan Henry sitting right there told us that,” Adelman said, pointing to Henry, who was sitting in the back, off to the side.

“The review isn’t over,” Rumsfeld said.

“Oh, I’m sorry. I thought it was going to the printer.”

“Well, the president hasn’t signed off.”

“If it’s going to the printer,” Adelman said, “whether the president’s signed off or not, it seems pretty far along.”

“All right,” Rumsfeld challenged. “Supposing it doesn’t have any cuts.”

“I think it’s astonishing,” Adelman said. “The whole world has changed. This was supposed to be the new Pentagon.”

Rumsfeld gazed at Adelman, clearly furious. He said that everyone in the building had agreed. “We all get along,” he added. “Sometimes you don’t need to cut and there was no reason to cut.”

An hour later the policy board was talking about the briefing they had received from (Generals John) Abizaid and (George) Casey. Both had said they were making progress in Iraq and things seemed to be going well.

“Again I think Ken has a different attitude,” Williams said.

“What’s that?” Rumsfeld inquired.

Adelman said that Casey had reported that military personnel – officers and enlisted – were being rotated out of Iraq about every nine months or less, on average. “When you look at history, I don’t know of any counterinsurgency that’s won by a country that rotates people out every six to nine months.”

“We’re not rotating all the people out,” Rumsfeld said. “We have Casey there.”

“I’m not talking about that,” Adelman said. “I’m talking about the people.”

“Let me tell you the reason for that,” Rumsfeld replied, describing Army and Marine recruiting and promotions.

“I’m not talking about what the Army wants to do and what the Marines want to do,” Adelman said. “What I’m talking about is winning the war. I don’t know any counterinsurgency that wins on a strategy like that.”

“Well, I think you’ve got it wrong because a lot of the soldiers go back in the theater for a second tour,” Rumsfeld said.

“What do you mean by theater?” Adelman asked.

“The CENTCOM theater.”

“Oh, so they go back to Afghanistan. That’s not what I’m talking about.”

“Well, some of them go back to Iraq.”

“Okay, but do they go back to the neighborhood they were in? What are the chances of that?”

“Almost never,” the secretary answered honestly.

“Well, that’s my point.”

“What’s your point?”

“They have to know who to pay off,” Adelman said. “They have to know whom to deal with. They have to know whom to maneuver. And that’s tough sledding. That takes time. Six months, they know nothing. Nine months?”

Rumsfeld screwed up his face. He cited a recent study showing that most of the casualties came in the first months.

“That reinforces my point,” Adelman said.

“It does,” Rumsfeld conceded.

…

Gingrich said that even though a fortune in executive manpower had been spent on the QDR strategy review, “None of that matters.”

Rumsfeld looked at him uncomfortably.

“Only Iraq really matters,” the former speaker continued. He said that the measure of seriousness was the 132 days it took to go from Ambassador (John) Negroponte to Ambassador Khalilzad. Iraq was only “the most important country in the world that all of American foreign policy hinges on,” he added sarcastically.

(Yeah, Newt sure is a funny guy. What a shame he had a problem with defending our country when it was his turn.)

After the meeting, Adelman ran into Rumsfeld in the Pentagon hallway. Rumsfeld indicated he wanted to talk further.

“See you,” said Adelman.

It would almost qualify as a comedy routine if all of it weren’t so tragic (and how ridiculous is it that Woodward has to point out a moment when Rumsfeld answers a question honestly?).

Meanwhile, the beat goes on…

Update 7/4: Just because Adelman knows more than I thought, it doesn't mean he still isn't a liar and an idiot (TP needs another pic, though).