Tuesday, April 22, 2008

Not Worthy Of The Uniform

I have a feeling I’ll be coming back over and over to the landmark story by New York Times reporter David Barstow in that paper’s Sunday edition about the military analysts appearing on TV and in print and other broadcast media selling the Iraq war to feather their own nests under the pretense of objectivity (here and here are two Daily Kos backgrounder posts). And though I am naturally reluctant to criticize anyone in our military, it is impossible not to do that after reading the story.

Simply put, if Bushco had put a fraction of the time into the actual planning and preparation for the aftermath of the ground war as they did into the selling and packaging of it, then I have a feeling we’d be winding down for real by now with much less of a loss of life suffered by our troops and innocent Iraqis (though I don’t mean to actually confer legitimacy on this epochal blunder by saying so).

The article lists many, many generals who allowed themselves to be used and abused by Don (“The Defense Secretary We Had”) Rumsfeld so they could gain access to him and other Pentagon “players” in the name of turning a buck (with Ret. Gen. William L. Nash the only one who walked away, according to the article).

And just to remind us of the type of person Rummy is (as if we could actually forget), Barstow provides the following…

The full dimensions of this mutual embrace were perhaps never clearer than in April 2006, after several of Mr. Rumsfeld’s former generals — none of them network military analysts — went public with devastating critiques of his wartime performance. Some called for his resignation.

On Friday, April 14, with what came to be called the “Generals’ Revolt” dominating headlines, Mr. Rumsfeld instructed aides to summon military analysts to a meeting with him early the next week, records show. When an aide urged a short delay to “give our big guys on the West Coast a little more time to buy a ticket and get here,” Mr. Rumsfeld’s office insisted that “the boss” wanted the meeting fast “for impact on the current story.”

That same day, Pentagon officials helped two Fox analysts, General (Thomas G.) McInerney and General (Paul E.) Vallely, write an opinion article for The Wall Street Journal defending Mr. Rumsfeld.

“Starting to write it now,” General Vallely wrote to the Pentagon that afternoon. “Any input for the article,” he added a little later, “will be much appreciated.” Mr. Rumsfeld’s office quickly forwarded talking points and statistics to rebut the notion of a spreading revolt.

“Vallely is going to use the numbers,” a Pentagon official reported that afternoon.

The standard secrecy notwithstanding, plans for this session leaked, producing a front-page story in The Times that Sunday. In damage-control mode, Pentagon officials scrambled to present the meeting as routine and directed that communications with analysts be kept “very formal,” records show. “This is very, very sensitive now,” a Pentagon official warned subordinates.

On Tuesday, April 18, some 17 analysts assembled at the Pentagon with Mr. Rumsfeld and General Pace, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

A transcript of that session, never before disclosed, shows a shared determination to marginalize war critics and revive public support for the war.

“I’m an old intel guy,” said one analyst. (The transcript omits speakers’ names.) “And I can sum all of this up, unfortunately, with one word. That is Psyops. Now most people may hear that and they think, ‘Oh my God, they’re trying to brainwash.’ ”

“What are you, some kind of a nut?” Mr. Rumsfeld cut in, drawing laughter. “You don’t believe in the Constitution?”
Grrrr…..

Even as they assured Mr. Rumsfeld that they stood ready to help in this public relations offensive, the analysts sought guidance on what they should cite as the next “milestone” that would, as one analyst put it, “keep the American people focused on the idea that we’re moving forward to a positive end.” They placed particular emphasis on the growing confrontation with Iran.

“When you said ‘long war,’ you changed the psyche of the American people to expect this to be a generational event,” an analyst said. “And again, I’m not trying to tell you how to do your job...”

“Get in line,” Mr. Rumsfeld interjected.

The meeting ended and Mr. Rumsfeld, appearing pleased and relaxed, took the entire group into a small study and showed off treasured keepsakes from his life, several analysts recalled.
When Rumsfeld eventually passes from this earth, I hope he is cremated and his ashes are scattered (preferably all over Iraq). I feel this way because I’m concerned about actually burying his body and contaminating the soil in the process.

Also, it should be noted that Vallely was particularly enthusiastic in doing Rummy’s bidding (and as sort of a freeper litmus test, Vallely involved himself in the Valerie Plame mess here, though his credibility was called into question then as now). He and some of his pals held firm to the belief that the Vietnam War was lost by our media, so they intended to practice some of Bushco’s legendary “message discipline” to make sure that, as far as they were concerned, that “mistake” never occurred again.

However, of all of the generals listed in the story, the one name that stood out for me was that of Retired General James A. “Spider” Marks, employed as a CNN analyst as well as a “rainmaker” of sorts for McNeil Technologies (this also tells us that he went on to work with the now-happily-ended presidential campaign of Willard Mitt Romney).

The reason it stood out for me is because, as noted here by Walter C. Uhler, Marks had firsthand knowledge of the blundering that ultimately led to the catastrophe in Iraq…

According to Bob Woodward, General Marks had been tasked with locating, neutralizing and securing each WMD site, once the invasion of Iraq commenced. And when he asked the "(Defense Intelligence Agency) smart guys" [Ibid] whether site number one was more important than site 946, one of the people…said dismissively: "Of course, General. Why wouldn't it be?" [Ibid, p. 94]

But when Marks asked whether the sites had been prioritized by the certainty of their existence or their importance, "nobody had a real answer." [Ibid, p. 95] And their answers were no more specific, when Marks asked: "Was the first site listed first because they thought it had the most WMD? Or was it because of the type of WMD - chemical, biological, nuclear or missile-related activity or another category? Was it related to the overall threat of the site? Or was it a matter of how quickly or easily Saddam could use the WMD? 'How are these things racked and stacked?' Marks asked." [Ibid]

Marks subsequently told General (David) McKiernan, "I can't get DIA to move. You need to fire me." [Ibid, p. 101] When that didn't work, Marks told McKiernan, "Sir, I can't confirm what's inside any of these sites." [Ibid] And he made that admission during the very period, when President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, (Rumsfeld), Secretary of State, Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice were bamboozling Americans into believing that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.

Moreover, unlike our idiotic and malevolent Vice President -- who requires just one percent of supporting evidence to act upon his preconceived biases and who once childishly gushed over a satellite photo purporting to show (but unable to prove) WMD activity -- Marks looked at similar photos only to conclude that, when doing so, "You're a pig looking at a watch." [Ibid, p. 99] Such is the huge uncertainty involved in the process.
And in spite of all of that, General Marks went on TV and sold the war to us anyway once he retired his commission.

I really don’t know what else to say in light of that, General, only that I may add that its denigrating to livestock for you to compare yourself in that manner. And I can’t imagine you actually looking at that metaphorical timepiece unless the numbers had dollar signs next to them (a shame it can’t count to 4,045, isn’t it?).

Update 5/6/08: God, he would have made a good president...

No comments: