How We Got Here (3/29/07)

I started this earlier this month, and to follow up, here's more from Bob Woodward’s “State Of Denial,” the third book in his "Bush At War" series (the first post in the series I started is here, the second is here, the third one is here, and the most recent fourth one is here; I'll consolidate these into a list the first chance I get).

(pp. 166-169)

(early April 2003)

Without mentioning it to (Jay) Garner, Rumsfeld was working on a plan to replace him with a new presidential envoy to Iraq, a significant upgrade over Garner’s position…

(Rumsfeld aide Ryan) Henry’s list of possible envoys included 100 names. It included former Tennessee Senator and Reagan White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker, former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and Harold Brown, former California Governor Pete Wilson, for Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, and former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. There were some Brits on the list – former U.K. Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington was one – as well as a couple of Democrats – Clinton Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Larry Summers.

(Steve) Herbits knew the Democrats were not serious options. Absent from the list were the people who had experience in postwar stabilization operations, such as Richard Holbrooke, the former Clinton U.N. ambassador who had negotiated a peace agreement among warring factions in Bosnia in 1996, and James Dobbins, Mr. Postwar, the former State Department official who had the most experience in post-conflict situations. They were not considered because of their association with Clinton nation building.

…

(Herbits) wrote that the best candidate was former Secretary of State George Shultz, who had once headed Bechtel Corporation, a major government contractor. Shultz, 83, had stature as one of the world’s most respected statesmen. Herbits called him “an international adult.” Upsides included, “Capable of holding ground against all comers in press and in negotiations,” and “Prevents DOD from being blamed for acts committed or omitted.”

The downsides included: “Not known for taking direction…Older – may falter if stressed too long…may be more tolerant of State’s viewpoints than DOD person…May be accused of taking on the duties in order to further Bechtel’s interests.”

But Herbits had a dark-horse candidate for the job. In his view the perfect person to run Iraq was Paul Wolfowitz. He composed a separate four-page memo that would eventually be sent to President Bush and find its way into the hands of Vice President Cheney.

…

Under the heading, “Benchmarks to Measure Success,” Herbits wrote, “In the months after the shooting stops, it is essential that there be no civil war. Civil wars, rightly or wrongly, hearken back to Vietnam. The president’s strategy will die in the embrace of such a comparison.

…

Because he was already the deputy defense secretary (Herbits wrote), Wolfowitz “has all of the necessary authority in his current position.

But perhaps the most important (reason) and exclusive to Paul personally, Herbits wrote, are the facts that he enjoys the widest support among Iraqis.” In this context, of course, “Iraqis” meant “Iraqi exiles,” especially (Ahmed) Chalabi.

Then Herbits added, “His being Jewish is a plus: It is a reminder that this is not a war against religion, it is a clear signal that the position is temporary, that the former ambassador to the world’s largest Muslim nation for three years” – Wolfowitz had been ambassador to Indonesia from 1986 to 1989 – “has experience in being culturally sensitive.”

Woodward then goes on to describe how this proposal was routed to Bush via a private fax after Rumsfeld took Herbits’ name off of it, though there is no indication given whether or not Dubya ever read it (Woodward does say that Dubya opposed this supposedly because he thought Wolfowitz didn’t have “a strong reputation as a manager”). However, Cheney did read it and mentioned it to Rumsfeld, with Woodward reporting that Cheney said, “Good paper” to Rumsfeld “with one of Cheney’s half smiles.”

This proposal did find its way to National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, who endorsed it, but Wolfowitz was eventually removed from consideration. When asked why by Woodward, Wolfowitz assumed that it was because he is a Jew.

This is yet another example (and there are sooo many in this book) of totally bogus non-communicating between key individuals and decisions made for reasons pertaining to political turf warfare at the expense of all else (especially the fact that the person selected had to be sympathetic to Rumsfeld and the Defense Department, and the more antagonistic to Colin Powell, Richard Armitage and the State Department, the better – that person eventually turned out to be Paul Bremer, who “greased the skids” to accelerate our present misery in his own infamous ways).

Also, it’s beyond belief to me that the names of people considered to replace Garner (and why Garner even needed to be replaced at all is definitely something to discuss) do not include a single Arab American or Arab national. And of course the people most qualified for the job were automatically removed because of their association with the Clinton Administration, as Woodward notes.

The fact that this proposal from Herbits got anywhere at all beyond a circular file is astonishing to me. I think putting a Jew in charge of Iraq makes about as much sense as putting an Arabian horses commissioner in charge of FEMA, don’t you?