From Tom Hughes and Democray for America:
Since the United States went to war in Iraq, nearly 1,700 of our troops have died there -- most of them long after President Bush put on his flight-suit to boast of an end to "major hostilities."P.S. -- At democracyforamerica.com, you can find a print version of the memo to post or hand out in your community, along with a print petition you can use to inform your friends and neighbors. And through our event planning tool, you can set up a Downing Street Memo table right at your own town square, student center or neighborhood corner.
Despite his declaration, though, the war rages on for our nation's sons and daughters -- with no end in sight. Senior military officers have started to admit off the record that, even if we stay for years, we may ultimately fail. Our country has paid a terrible price in blood, in tax dollars, and in the global reputation that generations of Americans have built.
It gets worse. A secret British document revealed last month -- the Downing Street Memo -- all but confirms a sickening truth. Obsessed with Saddam no matter what the cost, President Bush and his aides dragged the nation to war with fixed evidence and false claims about non-existent Iraqi WMD's.
Despite pressure from ordinary people who have read the few reports of the memo in the American press, the White House has stonewalled on the issue. And the vast majority of our complacent media allows it.
Enough is enough. I'm tired of waiting for President Bush to own up to the facts -- and we apparently can't count on our own media to ask the simple, tough questions.
So, first things first -- read the memo and commit to making sure every other American does, too:
http://www.democracyforamerica.com/memo
The Downing Street Memo makes clear that Bush wanted intelligence that justified a war, no matter how the facts had to be bent to get it.
The memo consists of the minutes of a meeting where the British intelligence chief, just back from the White House, told Prime Minister Tony Blair that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and facts," the Downing Street Memo continues, "were being fixed around the policy. The [National Security Council] had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."
Today, American soldiers and their families deal with the aftermath of a war hastily planned and poorly executed by an ideologically obsessed White House that finds money for corporate welfare, but not for armor for our troops.
The American people deserve an explanation -- but it's clear that even with Blair in Washington this week, the press won't do the job on its own. So we will have to take the memo directly to the people. Ask your friends, family and co-workers: have they read the memo? Ask them here:
http://www.democracyforamerica.com/memoinvite
Read the memo for yourself -- the full-text is at the end of this email.
We all have to spread the word about the deceptions it reveals. Together, we can put the truth on our leaders' agenda.
But it's going to take a lot of work. That's why grassroots DFA groups across the country will be setting up tables, handing out copies, and asking Americans: have you read the memo?
When it comes to matters of war and peace, doesn't every American deserve the truth?
Tom Hughes
Executive Director
Democracy for America
*** FULL TEXT ***
As originally reported in the The Times of London, May 1, 2005
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair CampbellIRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72-hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
[Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide]
[emphasis added]
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